First clear image of a working J-10C with WS-10 engines/ Source: Chinese social media As with so much in China’s air force, much of the J-10’s history is shrouded in mystery. It is understood that the J-10 fighter originated in the 1980s, the prototype was the J-9, a delta wing fighter that was abandoned in the 1980s. It is also believed that the J-10 enjoyed benefit from Israel’s Lavi fighter program. The J-10 fighter was considered a state secret until January 2007, when the media revealed that it had entered service with the PLAAF. A few months later, in May 2007, the Russian arms agency Rosoboronexport announced a $300 million deal to sell 100 Saturn AL-31 engines to China’s J-10 fleet. Then, at the end of 2008, the J-10A made its public debut at the Airshow China exhibition in Zhuhai. Since that time, the AL-31 has been the key engine for all variants of the J-10, from the original J-10A to the more advanced J-10C. Challenges related to the development of the domestic Shenyang WS-10 Taihang engine forced the J-10 to stick with the Russian engine longer than planned. Finally, in early May, a J-10C in a combat unit equipped with a WS-10 engine was discovered by the public. However, there is no official statement yet. Instead, a clear photo of a flying J-10C with a WS-10 engine appeared on social media. Andreas Rupprecht, author of China’s Modern Fighter, was one of the first observers to comment on this. “This is a real milestone not only for the J-10, but even more so for the WS-10 program as it marks the end of China’s dependence on the Russian AL-31 engine for the AL-31. with all three of the PLAAF’s main fighters, namely the J-10C, J-16 and J-20,” he said. He noted that a decade has passed since the J-10B first flew with the WS-10 and that the engine was tested on the J-10A even earlier. Finally, after years of improvement, it seems the WS-10 is reliable and safe enough to power a single-engine fighter. Mounted inside the J-10, the WS-10 can be identified by several characteristics. One is that the petals of the posterior burner are significantly wider than those of the AL-31. The WS-10 also has a structural ring inside the nozzle that is not present on the AL-31. The J-10A used by the Chinese aerobatic team can be distinguished from later variants by its rectangular intake that is not horizontal to the fuselage. This variant was in production until the end of 2014, when production switched to the J-10B. However, the J-10A has been modernized, including the ability to carry the PL-10 infrared-guided missile. However, to evaluate the success of the WS-10 engine requires one thing: Time. Only through use can we know if they are really good, really replacing the Russian AL-31 engines.

Pilot Wang Zunxi (a fairly well-known PLAAF officer) in an interview with China Central Television (CCTV 7) gave a very remarkable point of view. According to the veteran pilot, the multi-purpose fighter J-16 manufactured in Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and is being massively employed for PLAAF combat units of generation 4 ++. “J-16 fighter jets (including the J-16D electronic warfare version) have surpassed Russia’s Su-30 series heavy multi-role fighters in almost all tactical specifications. “. “The superiority shown in both avionics and electrodynamic properties, the radar reflection area reduction coefficient (RCS), the J-16 retains only the aerodynamic layout of the airframe”, pilot Vuong said clearly. Faced with the above situation, the Russian press stated that in order to seek export contracts or bring high morale and psychological state to the soldiers, the weapons manufacturers used very sophisticated promotional tools and are not always objective. Russian military experts rebuttal when emphasizing that the Chinese pilot is comparing the technical specifications of the electronic equipment on the Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2 fighters that are somewhat out of date. These fighters were supplied to the PLAAF 20 years ago, and they are actually significantly inferior to the J-16 when facing exercises (both for surface attack and long-range interception missions). ). The reason is that China’s Su-30 integrates the N001VE passive phase array radar (PESA), which ensures the realization of “truncated” synthetic aperture and “truncation” (SAR) mode with low resolution. , only allows the detection and classification of targets with large RCS parameters. In addition, the capacity and anti-interference ability of the N001VE radar is quite low, it can only catch the 1m2 RCS aerial target, 75 – 80 km away in case the enemy does not use electronic countermeasures. In fact, the J-16’s high energy and anti-interference active phase array (AESA) radar has a target capture range with 1 m2 RCS from 130 to 150 km, and high anti-interference ability, range is only slightly reduced in a highly noisy environment. This is due to the presence in the electronic architecture of the advanced AESA radar, which consists of more than 1,500 transceiver modules, each equipped with an individual arsenide / gallium nitride microwave transistor. Moreover, this type of radar is also capable of operating in synthetic aperture (SAR), reverse synthesized aperture (ISAR) and tracking ground targets moving in real time. Although the equipment for the J-16 is very advanced, the Russian side thinks that it is necessary to compare the J-16 with more modern modifications, for example the Su-30SM2 variant is about to enter service. Although the N035 Irbis radar that will equip the Su-30SM2 of the PESA class may be significantly inferior to the J-16’s AESA radar in terms of interference resistance, the capacity is higher (providing target acquisition range. with 1 m2 RCS at a distance of 250 – 270 km). With the N035 Irbis radar, the Su-30SM2 will have the ability to “foresee and shoot before” the J-16 in a direct confrontation situation, especially when Russia is still completing the long-range air-to-air missile “product. 180 ”. But it must be noted that the Su-30SM2 is still on paper, while the J-16 has been on duty for many years and there is no guarantee that the Russian fighter really possesses outstanding features. as they still publish.

An H-6K off Taiwan in 2016.

On March 26, 20 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLAAF) fighters departed from mainland China and approached Taiwan on two axes.

While most of Taiwan’s defense exploration aircraft were in the southwestern part of the island, four H-6K cruise missile bombers and one Y-8 support aircraft continued to fly towards Southeast through the Ba Si Strait separating Taiwan from the Philippines and then turns north, to an area in Taiwan’s eastern international airspace.

In other words, PLAAF bombers have surrounded Taiwan – a move that flyers Global Times China’s considered capable of deciding during wartime. “From that position, the PLA could not only attack military facilities on the eastern side of the island, but block the island completely.”

But it is far from concluded that the PLAAF can easily do this in combat. First, enemies – Taiwanese and American forces with missile batteries, air defense fighters and missile warships – must be taken into account.

Second, it is not clear whether PLAAF crews possess the skills and support necessary to reliably and safely fly thousands of kilometers across the vast Pacific Ocean.

Land combat was difficult. Air combat on the ocean is even more difficult. On the water, navigation, communication, and coordination – not to mention effective combat with an experienced, high-tech enemy – have been a big deal.

“Although the PLAAF is increasing the number of flights at sea, they acknowledge the challenges associated with training to fly in the far seas,” authors Kenneth Allen and Cristina Garafola wrote in a survey. newly funded by the US Air Force in terms of the history and organization of the Chinese Air Force.

Allen and Garafola cited a 2017 interview. Chinese pilots from the PLAAF’s Southern Command have discussed some of the issues their air force is trying to solve to improve their capabilities. combat ability in “far sea”.

Communication stories at the top of the list. “Due to limited communication measures during long-distance training, comprehensive support measures – including regular radars, command and air communications aircraft, naval ships and satellites communication – needs to be better integrated, ”writes Allen and Garafola.

They continued, “Compared to flying on land, training at sea is more likely to deviate from the designed flight path.” High-difficulty subjects related to offshore training pose new challenges to the technical and tactical abilities of many pilots. These subjects include attacking sea targets, aerial combat against different types of aircraft on land and water, aerial refueling and combat with enemy navies.

In particular, on physical challenges, flight times longer than four hours often lead to pilot fatigue.

Weather conditions during marine training are unpredictable – and gathering weather related data remains a challenge.

Long-distance search and rescue operations remain a challenging task for the PLAAF due to limited search and rescue equipment, low night vision and complex weather conditions. trash.

Long-distance flight training continues to challenge PLAAF’s maintenance assistance capabilities. Many incidents related to maritime cannot just take the option on land but apply it.

The PLAAF knows that they have water problems. “The high seas drills will become part of regular training,” said Dinh Lai Hang, a PLAAF lieutenant general, in 2017.

The PLAAF is “gradually expanding its long-distance training operations. Weapons, equipment, communications systems, supplies and aviation search and rescue skills have to keep up with mission requirements, ”added General Dinh.

The fact that the Chinese air force safely conducted sky missions near Taiwan in March could be a hint that its sea flight training efforts are beginning to succeed.

Of course, performing long-range, above-water missions in peacetime was one thing. Performing that task while someone is shooting at you is completely different.